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Resumen:  
 
El presente ensayo tiene como objetivo principal analizar la relación causal existente entre la 
cultura política y las instituciones, con referencia a la consolidación democrática. En este 
caso y contrario a lo que se propone en la literatura disponible, la cual otorga valores 
predominantes a cada uno de los elementos mencionados, se muestra una relación de 
dependencia entre ambas variables, la cual tiene como consecuencia la consolidación 
democrática. El estudio realizado se centra en la región de América Latina y se pone 
especial énfasis en los siguientes países: Chile, Ecuador, Perú y Uruguay, La primera 
hipótesis analizada, es entonces: que el establecimiento de instituciones democraticas 
fuertes como por ejemplo partidos politicos estables y un sistema judicial independiente, crea 
una cultura politica democratica. La segunda hipotesis propuesta en este ensayo es que la 
existencia previa de una cultura política democrática conlleva a la consolidación del sistema 
democrático.  
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Abstract:  
 
This essay aims to analize the relationship that exists between a democratic political culture 
and strong democratic institutions. In this sense, this paper focuses on the fact that there is a 
correlation between those two variables, and that only by that, democratic consolidation can 
be reached. This paper, then, contradicts the existent literature that affirms that either one of 
the two variables is always predominant in comparison with the other, with regard to 
democratic consolidation. This study, then, focuses on the Latin American region, making 
special emphasis on the Chilean, Ecuadorean, Peruvian and Uruguayan cases. The first 
hipothesys tested along this paper focuses on the fact that previous establishment of strong 
democratic institutions such as and independent judiciary and stable party systems create a 
democratic political culture. The second hypothesys tested is that a democratic political 
culture that involves tolerance, trust in democratic institutions and preference for democratic 
values, derives in democratic consolidation. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Latin America is often recognized among scholars because of its variant and undefined 
political regimes, which is why it has become a main source of inquiry and research. However, 
even if most of papers written about the region explain the development of each democratic 
regime, they do not necessarily focus on the reasons why these phenomena occurred; neither 
do they explain the prominent differences that exist between Latin American democracies. As 
the literature suggests, democracy can be created without the necessity of strong political 
institutions and/or the existence of a democratic political culture amogst its citizens; however 
if it does not become consolidated, its lifetime is debatable, because of the legitimacy problem 
that weak democratic institutions will imply and because of the discontent that 
underrepresentation and ineffectiveness of the latter, will cause among the ctizens. Thus, in 
various cases, where the conditions for consolidation are not met, democratic regimes cease to 
exist. 
This paper, however, focuses on the necessary conditions for democratic consolidation, which 
only happens when a democratic political culture develops amongst its citizens. This means 
that citizens trust a particular system of institutions that make up the government and they 
respect the opinions that differ with their own, thus they believe that acting outside the 
democratic framework is somewhat unimaginable, and consider democracy as the only viable 
way of government. In this sense, I will argue that strong political institutions such as stable 
party systems and an independent judiciary constitute an important element on the creation of 
democratic political culture, and only when this two previously stated conditions are met, 
democracies become consolidated. In order to test my hypothesys I will emphasize the cases 
 12	  
of Chile, Ecuador, Perú and Uruguay, as they represent the divergent spectrum of democratic 
political regimes among the region, mentioned before. 
For the purpose of relating both of the conditions with the existence or absence of democratic 
consolidation, I will distribute the contents of this paper as follows: in the second chapter, I 
will briefly state what other authors have said about democratic political institutions, 
democratic political culture and democratic consolidation; analyzing each variable in different 
sections, in order to take into account most of the relationships others have found between 
democracy and each of the above mentioned variables. In the third chapter, I will explain the 
methodology used, such as the opinion survey results of the Latin American Public Opinion 
Project, 2012 and the results obtained in the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report, 2012. The fourth chapter of this paper will focus on the discussion, 
which can also be interpreted as a comparison between what others have said and the results 
obtained in this research.  Chapter five contains my concluding remarks. 
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Chapter 2: Institutions, Culture and Democracy 
 
As it was explained earlier, both culture and institutions represent the ground stones upon 
which democracy is built, however the importance attributed to each of them, varies according 
to the current of thought through which it is analyzed. In this sense, there are various 
perspectives such as the “non-culturalist” or “institutionalist” view, the “weakly culturalist”, 
and the “culturalist” view, each of them will be better explained in the next sections of this 
chapter, however I intend to introduce the three of them here.   
According to Pzreworski, Cheibub and Limongi, the “non-culturalist” point of view, 
establishes that institutions are the only factor that determines wether a democracy exists or it 
doesn’t, “institutionalists”, thus argue that there is no need of a dermocratic culture in order to 
create and establish democratic political instititutions given that culture has no effect in the 
latter. The “weakly culturalists”, in the other hand, state that a democratic culture is necessary 
for the establishment or creation of democracy, however this approach argues that customs 
and preferences are malleable, meaning that even if a democratic political culture is necessary, 
it cannot be determined, because there is no constant parameter to measure it. Finally, the 
“strong culturalists”, believe that culture is the determinant factor for the existence of 
democracy; they argue that in some countries, democracy is just not plausible, because there is 
no cultural background that can support it. 
Once these differences have been clarified, I will proceed to state the reasons why the Latin 
American continent has been chosen to be the protagonist of this paper. As Vinicio Cerezo 
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stated during the XXI Iberoamerican Summit, Latin America has experienced a radical shift in 
the composition of its political institutions, governments have worked over the past decades 
towards the strenghthening of its institutions, however, countries find themselves living in the 
same situation they have lived in the previous years. Aditionally, the democratic regimes in 
the Latin American region have not experienced a process of fortification, in fact, democracy 
has deteriorated. Given to the increasing inequality that characterizes the region, the 
concentration of wealth in few hands, the increase of extreme poverty, and the few 
opportunities regarding education, health and security that have been granted to the 
population, the political culture of the region has expierenced a decay, with the deterioration 
of trust and tolerance. 
In fact, as it has been stated by Juan Rial in the same summit, the democratic stabilization of 
the region depends enormously on the social response to the politics created by the already 
strenghthened institutions. In this sense, the middle and lower economic classes, represent a 
great risk for the democratic consolidation in the region given to the great discontent they have 
expierenced for the economic redistribution and accumulation. As it has been stated before, 
the democratic regimes need among other things, estabilization, which can only come through 
the combination of institutions and culture. 
Nowadays, there are different conceptualizations of citizenship, and thus, this represents a 
different behavior from them towards democracy in general, and institutions specifically. So 
as it has become evident, citizens from lower classes have responded in a negative manner to 
this emerging economic inequality. As the author suggests, countries like Bolivia, have 
become more acceptant of their multinations and multicultures, inside their own territories and 
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they had incorporated into their political spectrum, policies that include and represent these 
“contradictive cultures”. 
As to other Latin American countries, it can be said that they have been turning in the same 
way that Bolivia; most of them have tried to create democratic cohesion by the 
implementation of leftist policies. In this sense, Ecuador, has implemented the “revolcuion 
ciudadana” model, in which the policies are directed towards the citizens of lower classes that 
worship the Ecuadorian leader; coupled with the reinvention and restorement of the political 
regime, granting an enormous amount of power to the executive branch of government over 
other powers. Venezuela too, has had policies that are implemented with the premise that, in 
spite of his dead, Chavez is the center upon which the new model of institutionalism which is 
based on the weakening of the democratic political culture, because it creates political 
intolerance between the upper and middle classes citizens towards lower class citizens, and 
viceversa. 
According to Daniel Zovatto, even if almost all Latin American countries enjoy of the 
existence of democratic regimes, their consolidation is debatable. He argues that at least a 
minimalist conception of democracy is guaranteed in the region; however, he doesn’t really 
know up to what point these democratic regimes will last.  As he mentions,  
“Latin American democracies show varying degrees of fragility and face important challenges, 
such as institutional problems that affect governance and the rule of law, the independence of 
and relationship between the different branches of government, the operation of electoral 
systems and the political party system, as well as major problems in the security of citizens.” 
(Zovatto, 2011). 
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Then, if a non-minimalist conception of democracy is to be implemented in the region, the 
author argues that there are several characteristics that should be changed and reinforced. In 
this sense, he says that re-election should be re-thought, because nowadays  
“re-election is allowed in 14 of the 18 countries, and only four of them ban it: Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, and Paraguay. In Venezuela indefinite re-election is permitted. In 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, The Dominican Republic, and Colombia consecutive re-
election is allowed, but not indefinitely. It is possible with at least one intervening term in 
seven other countries: Costa Rica, Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay” 
(Zovatto, 2011).  
Zovatto argues that re-election is a characteristic of weakened institutions, and centralization 
of power in the executive branch of government, which often derives into the development of 
personality cults towards the president. He also argues that for this state to be achieved it is 
necessary to guarantee certain kinds of freedom to the citizens, specially freedom of speech, as 
to which he describes that the present state of the South American region is very fragile. He 
claims, “The relationship between the media and the government is under increasing strain”. 
(Zovatto, 2011) As he states it, the region has faced several problems of transparency and 
accountability, and thus it has also provoqued governments to state that media is their true 
enemy, instead of  opposition candidates; as to this governments have decided to create new 
ways of  information “by establishing their own media to use as propaganda machines, or by 
using official advertising as an indirect means of censorship” (Zovatto 2011). 
Finally, I consider it of outmost importance to state that the literature confirms the fact that 
Latin America is a region in which political parties and congress are inefficient, they have less 
 17	  
political power, and thus Latin Americans trust less in these institutions. As it has been stated 
in this chapter, culture too, has been shaped by the preferrences of the region’s citizens, who 
besides their economic situation and political ideology, are reluctant to the fact that the 
democratic regime is the solution to their problems, or the better option for their country, some 
in a bigger scale than others.    
2.1: Strong Democratic Institutions 
 
A democratic regime is characterized by the fact that the population of a determined country, 
gets to actively participate in the decisions and events that shape the country. In this sense, 
political institutions are designed, in a democratic regime, to represent the needs and desires of 
its population, or at least of the vast majority. In this sense, Przeworski (2003) argues that 
citizens are organized, in a democracy, as groups that follow certain interests and work 
together towards the achievement of the latter. He says that citizens are arranged inside this 
groups working under the umbrella of the democratic institutions of thir country, both 
following their rules and principles, and simulating the manner in which the latter work 
towards the enforcement of their projects or laws. 
Thus political parties are the greatest representation of a democratic institution, because in 
their purest form and from a theoretical perspective, they are designed to be the representative 
institutions that guide the interest of the population towards the implementation of citizens’ 
desires towards the formulation of public policy. Their structure is supposed to be designed in 
a hierarchical manner, so it can have both leaders and followers, not being integrated by the 
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groups of people mentioned above, but by individuals who feel that they are fully represented 
by the institution they have choosed. 
It is important to understand, before getting any further, that the functionality of democratic 
political institutions is to represent individual,s who are not going to stand for their beliefs or 
desires by their own. Citizens who choose to live under a democratic regime, are fully aware 
that what they do is not excersising their power in a direct manner, but rather through voting, 
they delegate their responsibilities and decision-making capability to whom they believe are 
going to represent them in a better way. As Samuel Huntington (1991, 109) states “[…] of 
greater importance is that in all democratic regimes the principal officers of government are 
chosen through competitive elections in which the bulk of the population can participate. 
Democratic systems thus have a common institutional core that establishes their identity.” 
As Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993) expose, the institutionalist perspective has three main 
concerns: first, to study the way in which institutions shape politics, in this sense they have 
come to the conclusion that it is not institutions per sé that shape them but rather the rules and 
procedures that guide them, in this sense both the rules and the procedures of institutions in a 
democratic regime, are extrapolated to the cultural aspect of the regime in general, shaping too 
the behavior and preferrences of citizens; however, they argue that culture has no effect on 
politics; “institutions influence outcomes bacuase they shape actor’s identities, power and 
strategies” (Putnam, et al. 1993). Second, the authors argue that institutions are the only factor 
that shapes politics, however intitutions themselves are influenced and shaped by the context 
in which they are created, in this sense, the historical circumstances influences the character of 
the institutions that are chosed by the citizens of a determined country. Third, the belief that 
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institutions are shaped by the social context of the country is less common but also exists, 
arguing that all contrare to the second approach, behavior shapes institutions and not 
viceversa. 
In either approach taken, the main factor needed for the existence of a solid democratic regime 
are strong and stable democratic institutions; they are the only sufficient condition for the 
existence of a consolidated democratic regime. As Wiarda and Kline (2006, 180) state: “in 
most consolidated democracies with presidential systems, such as the United States, the chief 
executive is usually elected as the candidate of a political party. The president is checked and 
balanced by a congress, and whether the president’s party has a majority in that legislative 
body is crucial for decision making.” In light of this, it can also be stated that for 
institutionalist approaches, the most important institutions for the consolidation of democracy 
are Political Parties and Congress. 
Having already explained some of the general beliefs about the importance of institutions, I 
will proceed to analyze Latin American institutions, as they are one of the two objects of study 
in this paper. Wiarda and Kline (2006) argue that institutions in Latin America are struggling 
for their survival, they say that even though there have been strenghthenment processes 
applied to them, they still lack of legitimacy and popular support to their proper functioning. 
They focus their study on political parties, and they say that even though they have played an 
important role in political processes that have taken place in the more or less democratic 
countries, however it has also happened, and more frequently that  “the parties have frequently 
been peripheral to the main focal points of power, and the electoral arena has been considered 
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only one arena among several. Many Latin Americans have viewed political parties as divisive 
elements and hence have not held them in high esteem” (Wiarda and Kline, 2006, 200). 
As a result of these weakened political parties, there have been two approaches, firstly, people 
tend to ignore them and repudiate them because they don’t feel represented by these unpaired 
institutions; second, there has been a tendency to shape democracy around other institutions, 
lowering the importance of the parties and pretending that a democratic regime can work 
without them (Wiarda and Kline, 2006). As stated by Dieter Nohlen (2007), political 
institutions have suffered a great decay in the past 4 decades; in light of this, the 
personalization of politics represent the situation described above. Presidents become the main 
source of attention and the responsables for the future of the country, however, the institutions 
that back him up, seem to be, form the public perspective, of little or no use. This sets the road 
for Latin American presidents to try and erase political parties from the political map, while 
they strenghthen institutions that are immediately below the executives mandate. 
Thus, Nohlen (2007) proposes the fact that the major problem confronting Latin America is 
the lack of legitimacy of governments, precisely because of the fact that as political parties are 
not representative institutions as the theory mandates it should be, citizens lack interest on the 
political outcomes. The author states that there should be a differentiation between the lack of 
participation and the lack of interest, because the first one has to do with the number of voters, 
and quantitative data, however, the latter has to do with the perception of effectiveness of 
democracy as a regime. Nohlen then suggests that the main reason why legitimacy becomes a 
problem to Latin American democratic givernments is because they don’t change democratic 
institutions, there are no substantial reforms; the president’s figure is still and more than ever, 
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the one that glues all of the governments policies, and mantains the nation-states together, as a 
whole, instead of the original institutions that were created to meet this end such as political 
parties and congress.     
Institutionalists believe that if institutions are strenghthened and reformed, the problem of 
legitimacy could be solved, and thus the level of satisfaction with the democratic regime will 
be higher, helping to stablish and maintain the democratic consolidation. According to Nohlen 
(2007), the presidential “lame-duck” is a phenomena derived form the equitative distribution 
of power between all of the State’s branches, when they lack the capacity to cooperate 
between themselves. It is only logical, then, to say that what institutionalists argue is that 
without the proper consolidation of the basic democratic institutions, democratic 
consolidations is not viable.   
The institutional perspective, in this manner, argues that institutions are built with the purpose 
of achieving the implementation of certain policies and projects, guided through the interests 
of the citizens. Thus, what is expected in order to trust in the democratic institutions is the 
effective manner in which they can implement the latter. A consensus has not been made on 
which of these interests should be met firstly, wether it is education, representative laws, etc, 
neither has there been a consensus on how to implement these projects and laws. Political 
institutions are then expected to act in the name of the citizens, and their needs. However, one 
of the most prominent issues present in Latin America nowadays, is the inefficiency with 
which they implement these projects: “It’s easier to build a road than to create an institution or 
organization to maintain that road” (Putnam, et al. 1993).     
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In this sense, as mentioned by Przeworski (2003), every single democratic regime is uncertain; 
but it works because citizens know what to expect from it. “Democracy only exists if there is 
real competition between candidates, and throughout the world political parties have been the 
organizations that have presented such rival candidates.” (Wiarda and Kline, 2006, 203)  
Then, citizens know that they have the same chances of losing than the chances they have of 
winning, they chose the institutional framework under which these decisions are taken, and 
they know that they are fully represented by the people they chose to be in power; thus, if 
there are strong institutions instaurated in the country, uncertainty will not be a problem. 
Democracy is a system of “organized uncertainty”, but it works if there are strong and stable 
institutions that can regulate these outcomes.  
On the other hand, judicial independence is a crucial element that constitutes strong 
democratic institutions; in this sense, I deem it necessary to expose some of the ideas shared 
by other authors regarding this perilous concept. In this sense, a judiciary system is considered 
to be independent when it does not rely on external factors such as other democratic 
institutions or agencies. In addition to this, as in any other definition, there are several 
approaches, some more radical than others; in light of this, “independence from ideology” 
(Kahn 1993:89) is a requisite for some, mainly, party detachment, which guarantees 
impartiality. For others, political insularity is absolutely necessary, meaning that the judicial 
branch of government should not respond to or depend upon any other branch of government 
or political institution, however, according to Juan Carlos Donoso (2009, 2)  
“While the judiciary must be autonomous from other political institutions and the public, to 
safeguard horizontal accountability and the rule of law, the judicial system and all of its 
members are also accountable to the constitution.” 
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In this sense, a precise measure of judicial independence would require some sort of statistical 
comparison between judicial preferences and judicial results (Linares Lejarraga 2004), 
however, the existing literature has opted for more indirect forms of measurements.   
Instutionalists, then, assert that democracy can be created and maintained without the 
necessity of a previous democratic political culture. They don’t deny that democracy can 
shape the culture of a country and create new sets of values that are going to help democracy 
endure; however, they do believe that democracy by itself cannot create democracy and 
neither can it guarantee democratic institutions survival.   
2.2: Democratic Political Culture 
 
Political culture is thought to be by both the “weakly culturalist” and the “strong culturalist” 
point of view, the main source for democratic consolidation. In the words of Samuel 
Huntington (1991, 258):  
“The democratic culture issue focuses attention on the relation between the performance or 
effectiveness of new democratic governments and their legitimacy – in other words, the extent 
to which elites and publics believe in the value of the democratic system”.  
Likewise, he states the fact that legitimacy is intertwined with the effectiveness of the 
democratic regime; for this purpose, he uses the same definition of legitimacy that was used in 
the previous section of this chapter, by authors like Przeworski and Putnam. However, the 
difference between his argument and the institutionalist argument, lays on the fact that he 
exemplifies it as a vicious circle, where legitimacy produces regime’s effectiveness, 
thereupon, effectiveness endures the regime’s legitimacy. 
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In this sense, culture plays a dominant role regarding democratic consolidation, given that 
every single one of its components, such as: tolerance, trust, participatory values, democratic 
preferrences, and well-bieng, determines if there is a crucial characteristic of any democratic 
regime. Harrison and Huntington (2003, 68), present the idea that in the long run, democracy 
is not attained simply by making institutional changes, or through elite-level maneuvering. Its 
survival also depends on the values and beliefs of ordinary citizens”. 
Going back to Pzreworski, Cheibub and Lemongi’s statement: both culturalist approaches, 
state that the existence of determined cultural patterns are essential for democratic 
establishment and maintenance, for instance, un-educated population, extremely passionate 
citizens (who can’t control their emotional reactions towards government’s new policies), 
among other factors, seem to play a characteristic role in the installation of democracy. The 
authors argue that attitudes and behavior, which come along with these characteristics, could 
jeopardize the duration of a democratic regime. Furthermore, culturalists believe that citizens, 
who don’t have a democratic political culture, won’t be able to meet with the condiions 
required by the regime even if they do wish to live under a democratic rule.  
When a democratic regime has been stablished, and no previous democratic political culture 
was met, weakly culturalists, believe that it can be learned and adopted, because no condition 
is permanent: for them, as it was mentioned earlier, everything is constantly changing. Even if, 
at the beginning, citizens will keep on practicing whatever it is they are acostumed to do, that 
will find the ways to inconrporate the new habits into their day-to-day life: not only are they 
capable of learning, but they will learn how to act as democrats. Consequently, institutions are 
not a sufficient condition for the instauration of democracy.  
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A political culture favorable to democracies is needed in order to endure a democratic regime. 
As mentioned by the authors, democracy is considered to be the psicological ground towards 
the incorporation of democratic values to the political regime. Thereupon, democracy depends 
mostly on the fact that citizens believe that democracy is the only and the best option for their 
government, this can be expressed in several manners such as feelings, evaluations, cognition, 
and orientation towards the political issues of the country. Correspondinlgy, Inglehart (1990) 
mentions that in order for a democratic regime to reach stability, a democratic culture should 
be already stablished; he says that the main factors for this culture are inter-personal trust, 
satisfaction with the regime, and support for revolutionary change (which is supposedly 
damaging for any knid or democracy). Inglehart (1996) also states that the amount of the first 
and second characteristics share directly proportional relationship with the number of years of 
democracy enjoyed in a country, while the latter has an inversely proportional relationship.  
Accordingly, Weingast (1997), asserts that the creation of a common set of values within 
citizens, is a necessary tool for democratic institutionalization; in this sense, citizens should 
not only grant power to the government but they should also set limits to their actions, and 
most importantly, they should be willing to stand up against the possible abuses that 
governments could commit, both resulting from and generating interpersonal trust and 
tolerance. According to the author, then, democratic stability is reached only when three 
conditions (that make up political culture) are met: firstly he referres to the citizens sticking up 
to the limits that they themselves have created and imposed through the Constitution; second, 
when citizens decide to get together against possible abuses the government could commit, 
and finally, democracy becomes stable when citizens are willing to actually act in order to stop 
if the abuses were to be made.  
 26	  
In contrast with the institutionalist perspective already exposed, culturalists hold the idea that 
culture plays a more significant role towards democratic consolidation. Even, if as Harrison 
and Huntington (2003, 85) expose, economic development plays an important role in the 
process, it ends up contributing to the implementation of a democratic political culture. 
Chiefly, its role is to:  
“bring gradual cultural changes that make mass publics increasingly likely to want democratic 
institutions and to be more supportive of the ones that are in place […] development tends to 
make mass publics more trusting and tolerant and leads them to place an increasingly high 
priority on autonomy and self-expression in all spheres of life, including politics, and it 
becomes difficult and costly to repress demands for political liberalization. With rising levels 
of economic development, cultural patterns emerge that are increasingly supportive of 
democracy, making mass publics more supportive of democracy and more skillfull at getting 
it." 
As Diana Orcés (2009, 142) claims, factors such as perception of threats, are substantial for 
the creation or stablishment of democratic culture, however, it is only through the effects these 
factors bring to political culture, that they are able to influence democratic consolidation or 
not. In this sense, if they can “lead to an increase in political intolerance, activat[e] 
authoritarian attitudes, and thus support an authoritarian system”, it becomes evident that they 
are generating a profound change in political culture and in light of this change, they are 
affecting, in an indirect manner, to democratic stabilization or consolidation. In adition to this, 
the author also argues that a democratic regimes’ lifetime, relies upon the support for 
democratic values.   
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By the same token, other culturalists such as Muller and Seligson argue that democratic 
stability is the previous characteristic for the creation of political culture and not viceversa; 
they expose the idea that if a stable democratic regime has not been created, citizens will not 
have any incentives or examples that would help them create this democratic culture needed 
for the preservation of the consolidation of a democratic regime. As it becomes evident, then, 
when analyzing the component of political culture, it is of outmost importance to state a clear 
differentiation between the approaches that are supposed to represent the regime’s 
stratification. 
 Summing up all of the culturalist approaches, what we get is that there are three momentums 
in political culture that are most prominent for its study. Firstly, when citizens want to live 
under a democratic regime, when they believe that independently from the results that it can 
throw it is the better option, or at least they act as if the believed that democracy is the least 
bad regime, and so they seek its implementation and consolidation. Second, when citizens 
don’t get the results they were aiming to obtain, they still accept whatever outcome that has 
resulted from the democratic process; as long as decisions are taken through the application of 
democratic procedures, citizens accept it as an obligation not to like it, but rather to follow it; 
it should also be mentioned that sometimes, even though citizens don’t believe that this 
obedience is derived from the applicability of the procedures, they respect contrare decision 
because they belive on participation, meaning that if they have been an active part on the 
process in which the results were decided, they are open to accepting them.  Thirdly, if 
individuals posess a democratic personality, that implies great deals of republican virtue, trust, 
tolerance, empathy, moderation and patience, they will be contirubuting to the process of 
democratics stabilization. In this sense, what the three momentums bring with them is the fsct 
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that citizens trust the system of government, they accept that if decisions taken through 
democratic process such as voting procedures were taken they are also to be complied, not 
only if the outcome was the expected, but always; characteristics that derive from the 
existence of a system of common democratic values, are the ones that lead to democratic 
consolidation.      
Therefore, the previous existence of a democratic political culture is necessary for the 
stablishment of democratic regimes, and in some of the cases as Lipset (1960) argues, this is 
only derived from the proper economic development. It is argued that the main reasons why 
this works successfully, (economic development transfomring into a democratic political 
culture), happens because of the creation of better and more levels of tolerance and trust in 
general. In the same sense, John Stuart Mill argues that the previous conditions necessary for 
the creation of a democratic political culture are strong political institutions. He says that in 
order to prolongue and maintain a democratic system, institutions are meant to create a 
democratic political culture first, thus, as institutions are equal in theory, there should be a 
parameter by which democratic political culture can be met or achieved.   
2.3: Democratic Consolidation 
 
Once political culture and institutions have been covered and explained, it is important to 
determine what democratic consolidation is. As we have seen so far, there are different 
approaches, and each of them attributes a different scale of importance to each characteristic 
in relation with democratic consolidation. But when is a democracy consolidated? In this 
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section, I will focus on the various definitions that have been given throughout the years, but 
firstly I believe it is necessary to explain in a very short manner, what democracy is.  
According to Linz (2001), a democracy is created when the citizens/electoral body, can freely 
choose their representatives, and when these democratic processes are not jeopardized or 
controlled by authorities or institutions. It is important to set a limit to the years that a person 
or organization can rule a country; because this limits the enormous power they would have 
had over the opulation and the country in general. According to the author two things are 
essential for the stablishment of a democratic regime: rule of law and legitimacy. 
As Huntington (1991, 258) argues, both institutions and culture play a determinant role 
towards democratic stabilization. According to him,  
“the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes (including, in the end, communist regimes) came to 
rest almost entirely on performance. The legitimacy of democratic regimes clearly rests in part 
on performance. It also rests, however, on processes and procedures.” 
The most interesting part of Huntington’s approach, however, is the fact that he assures that 
the essence of a democratic government is the way in which leaders respond to their own 
inability to solve the problems that affect the regimes rather than preventing or solving the 
problems.  
According to him, there are a few more factors that guarantee democratic stability, for 
example the cohesiveness with which they are able to establish relationships with other 
governmental institutions and as a consequence the strenghth with which they rule. The 
stability of democratic regimes, then, depends on: first, the ability of the principal political 
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elites – party leaders, business leaders- to work together to deal with the problems confronting 
their society and for these actors to be able to abstain from exploiting those problems to their 
immediate material or political advantage. In this sense, democratic stability depends upon the 
manner in which political parties above other institutions, but along with them, are able to 
handle this situation. Therefore in stable democracies: 
“No national political party, […] attempted to exploit the issue in order to delegitimize the 
democratic regime… no party persisted in blaming the various governments for creating the 
problem. No party claimed that the problem could be handled better outside of the democratic 
regime.” (Huntington, 1991, 260)  
As to what it is safe to say, that stable democracies are built upon two things: strong, stable 
and organized institutions, and a political culture that favours democratic values above others.  
Huntingotn also states that the ability to distinguish between the regime and the government or 
rulers is an intrinsic characteristic of democratic stabilization. Therefore, the case of 
Venezuela can be brought to attention to exemplify this characteristic, because in spite of the 
fact that there was discontent with the results of elections, citizens believe that there is no way 
more legitimate than voting procedures, and thus they remain supportive towards the regime, 
even if they are not as supportive, towards the government per sé.  
Therefore it can be argued that citizens should know that the regime is made up of rules and 
prcedures that they had chosen in order to guide the political processes of the country. 
Governments will eventually fail, as Huntington asserts, and the only viable solution for this 
phenomenon would be the implementation of institutionalized manners that can regulate the 
process. Hence, both institutions and culture are determinant for democratic survival. As it is 
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evident from the political culture aspect: democracies will not necessarily solution the 
problems that are brought about in the political sphere by many and diverse factors, but it 
means that if there are governments and/or rulers that are damaging the political environment 
and jeopardizing the lifetime of the regime, there will be ways in which they can be removed,  
as mentioned by Huntington (1991, 264)  
“the essence of democratic behavior is doing the latter because it is impossible to do the 
former. Disillusionment and the lowered expectations it produces are the foundation of 
democratic stability. Democracies becomes consolidated when people learn that democracy is 
a solution to the problem of tyranny, but not necessarily to anything else.” 
As it was stated in previous sections of this chapter, political participation is too, thought to be 
one of the determinant constitutents of democracy, however as it has been stated several times, 
political participation is only a supplementary element to it, consequently, it cannot threaten 
the stability of the democratic regime, nor can it cause it. On the other hand, what can 
provoque a destabilization on the regime, would be the weakening of political institutions, 
particularly political party systems. Regarding the Latin American case, a profound change in 
these institutions can be observed: when democratic regimes were first established, citizens 
were reluctant to let the same leader stay in office for more than one term, thus, the policies 
adopted by them, were more moderated in order to adapt themselves to the mainstream of 
opinion in their country; nowadays, however, incumbent leaders in the region adopt more 
extremist policies, and are more commonly elected for their personality traits than by the 
political organizations they represent, in fact, the region has expierenced a wave of outsiders’ 
elections. 
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As stated by Huntington (1991, 270) “voters not only rejected the incumbent party; they also 
rejected the principal alternative party or group within the political establishment and threw 
their support to a political outsider. […] [This phenomenon] tended to be more prevalent in 
Latin America where it was identified as populism.” In this sense, several presidential 
candidates that were elected in the region represent all that was contrare to the inicial 
principles promoted in the region. It is important to note, that political outisders are elected 
with a borad multiclass support, and as literature about populism suggest, in the pre-electoral 
stage outsiders show leftist tendencies, however, ocne in office they tend to follow non-
populist economic policies that were designed to cut government spending, promote 
competition and hold down wages. When there are disillusionment, intolerance and 
unhappiness towards the policies implemented by the government and the politicians, the 
solution posed by the citizens should rather be to use the democratic system’s instruments in 
order to remove them from office, and lead to changes in their policies. In this sense, 
“democracy is consolidated to the extent these in-system responses become institutionalized” 
(Huntington, 1991, 282). Keeping up with the premise that democracies are successfully 
established when electors and incumbents accept that they can lose as well as win, and when 
they know that when things go wrong it is not the regimes’ fault, but it rather is because the 
government is inefficient, and as to this the ruler is the one that’s changed, not the regime.   
The literature suggests that consolidation is brought upon thanks to several factors: firstly, 
prior democratic experience; second, more industrialized modern economy and education; 
third, foreign governments supportive of democracy; fourth, snowballing effects; fifth, that 
democracies are created through peaceful processes such as negotiated placements and 
transformations; lastly, citizens’ attitudes towards governments’ inability tu resolve problems. 
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In light of this, it can be argued that it is not only citizens who need to have democratic values, 
but leaders should too have the proper attitudes and values towards the democratic regime, 
they should have always in mind that the goals they should seek need to be intrinsicly 
relationed to the maintenance of the democratic regime and not to the personal goals they 
usually seek. As Arturo Nuñez mentioned during the XXI Iberoamerican Summit, the 
necessary conditions for the stability of the democratic regime are socio-economic 
development, legitimacy and efficiency of the democratic political system. 
Correspondingly, in the Latin American Public Opinion Project: Ecuador 2010, Juan Carlos 
Donoso, Daniel Montalvo and Diana Orcés mention that education is likewise, one of the most 
efficient ways of building up democratic political culture, however, they do not find a 
significant relationship between economic recession and decay in democratic support. As 
mentioned by the authors, democratic consolidation happens whenever citizens believe that in 
theory, democratic regimes are the best option of their country, in spite of feeling discontent 
towards the results produced by their governments. The authors also make allusion to the fact 
that even if economic development has no significant relationship, economic policies do. In 
this sense, the president’s economic policies whenever they are efficient (regarding the 
solutions they bring to economic problems), citizens will defend and support democracy as the 
political system that rules in their country, if this is not the case, it is most probable that they 
would start thinking about the implementation of punishments to the ones in power; summing 
it up, democratic consolidation is also affected by transparent and efficient policies in the 
economic aspect. 
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Comparatively, the authors mention that democratic stability comes hand in hand with the 
development of a political culture inside a determined society (where they too measure 
political culture in terms of political tolerance, and political system support), in this sense, the 
level of legitimacy that a democratic regime receives is a determinant element for democratic 
stability. Correspondingly, if citizens do not support the political system and they have 
freedom of acting, a change in the regime would become an inevitable outcome. Stable 
regimes, in the other hand, need strong institutions and political tolerance towards minority 
groups; in this sense, political stability comes from the stablishment of a political culture 
based on tolerance towards minority groups.  
If the case were to happen, where the political system counts with popular support but it 
doesn’t have political tolerance, as Donoso, Montalvo and Orcés call it: “authoritarian stability 
context”, in the short term, the political system has the support of the majority of people, 
however, it could be jeopardized in the future. In light of these assertions, the authors make 
allusion to this a possible scenario of political instability, which could carry significant 
violence along with it.  
Thereupon, when a regime has low legitimacy given that they have low support from the 
citizens and low levels of tolerance, democratic breakdowns are expected to happen. In this 
sense, if democratic institutions such as the judiciary and political parties are not supported by 
public opinion, then democracy becomes risky and unstable. Additionally, other factors that 
support democratic consolidation are: the number of political parties that are actively acting 
inside the Congress and how short are the periods in which a President is removed from office, 
and other is elected. Therefore, according to the authors democracy lasts given that citizen 
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support, tolerance and democratic values are present, they understand that even if they lost or 
their election was not the most popular choice, the chances of wining are still as big as their 
chances of losing, hence they don’t find it difficult to keep on interacting under the democratic 
regime; it is important to note that according to the authors, it is important to maintain a 
variety of forces that work together instead of a political party that predominates over the rest, 
as well as how frequently is the leader removed, the period between governments cannot be 
less than 2 years and more than 5, given that this would lead to the delegitimization of the 
government.     
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Chapter 3: Methodology & Results 
 
In this chapter I will test the following hypotheses: first, democratic political culture is caused 
by the establishment of democratic institutions; second, when a political culture has already 
been established, it provoques democratic consolidation. In order to ellaborate this analysis, I 
have decided to use data collected with public opinion surveys, by projects such as LAPOP 
(Latin American Public Opinion Project) – Vanderbilt University, and the Global 
Competitiveness Report – World Economic Forum. Both surveys consist on the study of the 
interests and perceptions given out by citizens regarding their country’s situation in the 
political, economical, institutional and social sphere; answers that for the effect of this analysis 
will be translated as factors that influence political stability and consolidation.   
3.1 Data and Methods 
 
As explained earlier, this paper’s hypotheses were tested utilizing two main data sources, both 
of them based on public opinion surveys carried out in the region. It is important to mention 
that given the short length of this paper, only 4 countries in the region have been chosen as 
examples to interpret the findings: Uruguay, Ecuador, Chile and Perú, countries that have been 
chosen given the wide range of differences existing between them and because they represent 
a perfect resemblance of the political scenario explained in the previous chapters of this paper. 
In one hand, the political culture component was tested with the utilization of the results that 
came from a survey carried out in 26 countries throughout 2012, as part of Vanderbilt 
Univeristy’s Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). On the other hand, the 
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institutional component was divided into judicial independence and strong political parties; in 
order to test the first factor, the results of the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report 2012-2013 were used, as to the latter factor, the author has designed a 
dychotomic model in which countries are classified into two categories: strong political parties 
or weak political parties.  
3.2: Dependent Variable 
 
For the purposes of this paper, the dependent variable ‘democratic consolidation’ has been 
operationalized as a dychotomic variable, meaning that it has two possibles values: it either 
exists, or it doesn’t. In this sense, both values come from a thorough socio-political analysis, 
in which citizens show interest or not in the democratic regime. Chiefly, for the existence of 
this variable, citizens of a determined country, need to believe that democracy is the best 
regime possible por their country, and they don’t think that problems in any sphere, are the 
regime’s fault, thus they don’t intend to change it. Moreover, citizens are able to differentiate 
between the democratic regime and the government or leader that rule the country.    
3.3: Independent and Interdependent Variables 
 
The interdependent variables in this paper are institutional features; specifically, strong 
political parties and judicial independence. Coupled with this, the hypothesys proposed, 
suggests that strong and stable political parties, along with an independent judiciary, are the 
responsibles for the creation of a political culture, which comprises diverse elements that will 
be explained in the next pages. And as it has been mentioned throughout the paper, political 
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culture that comprises democratic values is the responsible for the creation of democratic 
consolidation. 
To illustrate the first case, political parties, I have thought it necessary to give a broad 
definition of what strong and weak political parties are. As it can be seen in Manuel Alcantara 
and Flavia Freidenberg’s work about political parties in Latin America, citizens critisize the 
institutions, and as this happens, they promote other ways of representation, fact that weakens 
the institutionalist approach to democratic consolidation. In the authors’ perspective, political 
parties are still the institution that serves as the democratic pivot that glues it all together, and 
are supposed to settle political agreements, establish actions for the legislative production, 
provide institutions with personnel and make the political system operative. Political parties 
know how to movilize societies in order to look for strategies that allow them to win elections. 
According to both of the authors, the effective number of political parties in a presidential 
democracy can be measured after the elections, with a procedure that is as simple as analizing 
the number of parties existent and making a ponderation between this and the function of 
different weights, that these parties have. According to them, Latin America tends to be 
represented by multipartidism, which means that there are huge levels of polarization and 
bifurcation in the Latin American political sphere. However, if the institution per sé meaning 
the political parties, is strong, they are going to be able to control and adapt to this up and 
down levels of polarization, resulting in a stable democratic environment. However, if like the 
Ecuadorian or Peruvian case, the institution is not capable of controlling these divergent 
opinions, stereotypes, and the clevages form people who have not been able to incorporate 
them into the national community; institutions fail to guarantee the gobernability it is 
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supposed to guarantee. In this sense, I have decided to classify the political parties institutions 
into two categories: strong political parties and weak political parties, creating each category 
based on the characteristics given before.             
Country Party System 
Chile Strong Party System 
Ecuador Weak Party System 
Perú Weak Party System 
Uruguay Strong Party System 
 
Figure  1 - Party Systems 
	  
As Figure 1 illustrates, both Chile and Uruguay have strong political party systems, given the 
fact that in the first country, since 1990 (after Pinochet’s regime): parties have become 
traditional, there are no significant new emergent organizations and ideologically, they can be 
set apart one from another, in this sense, Concertación (coalition of parties for democracy) 
(center-left parties unified), UDI (Independent Democratic Union) and RN (National 
Renewal) (parties from the right). In the latter country, which has the oldest two’party system 
of the region, Colorados (left) and Blancos (right) represent the ideological polarization that 
characterizes the country; it is important to note that no new organizations have been created 
and thus, these parties generate a huge level of custom among citizens. On the other hand, 
Ecuadorian political parties are shown as weak, given that they are created in order to serve 
specific purposes such as the fact that they ae built around the image of its leader in order for 
him/her to get to power and then they disappear and new parties are created, there is no 
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consistency in the political parties’ ideology nor in the representation they offer, because there 
are too many political parties, resulting in lack of legitimacy; meanwhile, the Peruvian party 
system shares more similarities than differences with th latter: the political outsider 
phenomenon explained in chapter 2, applies perfectly here, while the institution does not count 
with the support or legitimization necessary for it to persist, thus it maybe possible that instead 
of generating new political parties, the institutions’ crisis could lead them to vanish. 
Now, I will present the second value of the interdependent variable “strong democratic 
institutions” in the following lines. First of all, I deem it of absolute importance to state what I 
understand as an independent judiciary, and how where the results of the World Economic 
Forum’s Competitiveness Report 2012 taken and interpreted. In this sense, the judiciary 
independence definition used here is the following, according to Prillaman (1967): a non 
politicized court system, were external forces have little to no influence towards the measures 
adopted by them.  “Judicial independence is not something that exists or does not exist. Each 
country’s political-judicial accommodation must be located along a spectrum that only in 
theory ranges form a completely unfetterd judiciary to one that is completely subservient” 
(Prillaman 1967, 17). In this sense, the World Economic Forum, measures judiciary indepence 
in a scale that goes from 1 to 7, were 1 means extremely politicized and 7 stands for totally 
independent.  
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Country Independent Judiciary 
Chile 5.3 
Ecuador 2.5 
Perú 2.5 
Uruguay 5.2 
 
Figure  2 - Independent Judiciary 
	  
As shown in figure 2, judicial indepence possesses a wide variation among the Latin American 
region countries, as we can see, Chile and Uruguay have got, once again, stronger democratic 
institutions, while Ecuador and Peru were situated again in the measurement of weak political 
institutions.   
Moving on, the independent variable in this study is ‘political culture’, which has been 
measured according to its three most important elements: tolerance, trust in the institutions 
(political parties and judiciary) and democratic values; as it was mentioned earlier, the results 
come from an opinion survey that was held in 2012 throughout Latin America. 
In addition to this, the independent variable of the present study is democratic political culture, 
which for the purposes of this study is defined as the ability of in order to measure tolerance, 
the following questions were used as a basis for the creation of an index that has been 
recodified into a 0-100 scale, where 0 is nothing and 100 is everything: “There are people that 
always say bad things about the Government, and about the political system, in generall. How 
strongly do you approve or disapprove, that these people have the right to vote?”, “How 
strongly do yo approve or disapprove the fact that these people can go out in public 
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demonstartions to express their opinion?”, “Thinking about the people that have poor opinions 
on the Government and are willing to express them publicly, how strongly do you approve or 
disapprove, the fact that these people have the right to run for office in any public 
institution?”, “Thinking about the people that have poor opinions on the Government and are 
willing to express them publicly, how strongly do you approve or disapprove, the fact that 
these people’s opinions are broadcasted via television?”  
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Figure  3 – Latin American countries comparison in Political Tolerance 
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As shown in Figure 3, political tolerance in the region, is proportional to the strength of the 
democratic political isntitutions; in countries such as Uruguay and Chile the average uprises 
50 points, with 64.4 and 56.6 points, respectively. In the other hand, countries such as Peru 
and Ecuador are located below the average 50 points, with 43.8 for the former and 43.4 for the 
latter.  As to this, it can be argued that the establishment of stable political institutions has lead 
to the creation of more tolerance inside the democratic regimea; as it was mentioned before, 
then, this relation should be explained taking as point of departure political parties. Whenever 
there is a custom that is generated because of democratic institutions, the customary practices 
that they imply and the clear division between ideological positions, lead to citizens to try to 
trust more in each other, and to understand that relations should exist among individuals 
whether they differ or they don’t.    
Moving forward, the second constitutent element of a democratic political culture is the level 
of preference towards democratic values inside a society. In order to measure this variable, 
then, the Latin American Public Opinion Project, inserted a related question inside their 
survey:  “if your country is confronting hard moments, do you think that it would be justifiable 
for the President to close the Congress and rule without it?” The question was measured as a 
dychotomic variable, therefore, the stadistics that result in the graphic interpretation, represent 
the percentages of the population that agree with the measure. In this sense, if a ctizen 
supports this kind of behavior, his preference towards democratic values is considered to be 
small, however, if he rejects these kinds of values, he is considered to have a more democratic 
political culture. As Figure 4 shows, 27% of Ecuadorian citizens and 22% of Peruvian citizens 
agree with this measure, opposite of what 10.3% of Uruguayan citizens and 6.4% of Chilean 
citizens preferr.      
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Figure  4 – Latin American countries comparison in Agrees with Closing Congress 
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Regarding trust in democratic institutions, two related questions were created in the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project’s survey of 2012, both measured in a scale that goes from 1 
to 7, where 1 means none and 7 means a lot. The first question was “How much do you trust in 
the judicial system of your country?” and the second question was “How much do you trust 
the political parties in your country?” After the recomplilation of answers, the scale was 
recodified into a 0-100 scale that meets the same parameters as the first graphic dicussed. 
In this sense, as Figure 5 illustrates, we can observe that countries where an independent 
judiciary has been established, mainly Uruguay and Chile, show a significantly bigger level of 
trust in the Justice System (52.7 and 47.8) in comparison to Ecuador (42.9) and Perú (39.4) 
which, as was discussed in previous sections of this paper, have a politicized judiciary, that is 
greatly influenced by external factors. Subsequently, Figure 6 shows that countries where 
political parties are stable, representative and well ideologicaly defined, such as Uruguay 
(41.8) and Chile (39.6), trust in the mentioned institution is bigger than trust in political parties 
of countries such as Ecuador (32.0) and Perú (31.3).  
In light of this, it becomes evident that the previous establishment of solid democratic 
institutions is necessary for the creation of political culture, that laterm, guides countries 
towards democratic consolidation.       
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Figure  5 – Latin American countries comparison in trust in the judiciary system. 
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Figure  6 – Latin American countries comparison in trust in political parties 
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
 
On the whole, the data presented in the previous section, suggest that there is an evident 
relationship between both strong democratic institutions and a democratic political culture, 
and between a democratic political culture and democratic consolidation. In this sense, as it 
has been mentioned by Martín Torrijos during the XXI Iberoamerican Summit, there is a 
significant relationship between democratic institutionalism and democratic policies, and thus 
they cannot be set apart in order to create a democratic consolidation. According to this, 
democratic stability depends upon the level of trust upon these institutions, and the 
representativity that they exercise towards its citizens.  
Thus, in Latin America, as it was showed in previous chapters, the growing tendency to elect 
political outisders as presidents, comes hand in hand with weakening political institutions, 
chiefly, political parties. Therefore, it is evident to see that, as explained before, trust in 
democratic institutions is key for the survival of the regime as a whole. In this sense, I believe 
that it is important to emphasize that as showed in the methodology and results section, 
countries that were considered since the beginning as not completely consolidated 
democracies have all of this factors: they have a weak democratic political culture and 
moreover, they previously had weak democratic institutions. As it is illustrated in Figure 7, 
there is a significant relationship between the dependent, interdependent and independent 
variables. One of the greatest consequences, of political outsiders is that they debilitate 
instititutions with their political inexpierience, and by this, they create an unfavorable 
environment for democracies to survive.  
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Country Party 
System 
Judicial 
Independence 
Political 
Tolerance 
Trust in 
Parties 
Trust in 
Judiciary 
Justifies  
closing 
Congress 
Chile Strong 5.3/7 56.6/100 39.6/100 47.8/100 6.4% 
Ecuador Weak 2.5/7 43.4/100 31.3/100 42.9/100 27% 
Perú Weak 2.5/7 43.8/100 32/100 39.4/100 22% 
Uruguay Strong 5.2/7 64.4/100 41.8/100 52.7/100 10.3% 
 
Figure  7 - Relationship Between Independent and Interdependent Variables 
   
Rule of law, judicial security, citizenship trust in the government, are then, important factors 
for democratic consolidation. 
In this sense, even if, as it has been said, other authors argue that only one of the previous 
factors exposed excerts a significant role towards the consolidation process of a political 
regime, what can be clearly seen in the data presented here, is that both of them are equally 
iomportant, because neither of them can guarantee democratic survival on their own.  
According to Donoso, Montalvo and Orcés, in order to maintain stability ina democratic 
regime, not only is support for a democratic political system necessary, but also support for 
democratic values, such as political tolerance. More specifically, support for a democratic 
system does not necessarily mean that citizens are tolerant toward minority groups who live 
under the same political system. While the majority of citizens support democratic rights, 
these same groups are usually considerably less likely to extend these rights to disliked 
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groups. Therefore, stable systems could be at risk, when the rights of the minorities are not 
guaranteed, given that if the support for the system is very high and political tolerance is low, 
the society could become authoritarian. 
As stated by Robert Dahl, Ian Shapiro and José Antonio Cheibub (2003, 113): 
“Democracies become consolidated if the conditional probability that a democratic 
regime will die during a particular year, given that it has already survived thus far the 
hazard rate, declines with its age, so that democracies are most likely to survive if they 
have lasted for some time. […] The conclusion reached thus far is that whereas 
economic development [without the development of strong democratic institutions] 
under dictatorship has at most a non-linear relationship to the emergence of 
democracies, once they are establoished, democracies are much likely to endure in 
more highly developed countries.” 
In this sense, strong democratic institutions and a democratic political culture, pave the road 
towards the consolidation of democracies. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 
First, it is important to mention that as an introduction to the theory generated in this paper, a 
thorough literature review has been made, where different political sciene approaches have 
been summarized. Consequently, institutionalism was interpreted as the approach that believes 
that institutions are the sole responsible for the creation of democratic regimes and their 
stabilization/consolidation. Weakly culturalists, on the other hand, attribute political culture 
the responsibility of democratic consolidation, however, they argue that this democratic 
culture can be shaped by external factors such as social context. Lastly, strong culturalist 
approaches are based on the fact that only political culture can successfully derive into the 
creation and consolidation of democracies.      
Evidence from the World Economic Forum and the Latin American Public Opinion Project 
presented in the data and methods section of this paper, demonstrates that there is a 
relationship between the previous existence of stable democratic institutions, such as storng 
political parties and an independent judiciary, along with the creation of a democratic political 
culture, that implies high levels of trust in political institutions, preference of democratic 
values above other political attitudes and tolerance to contrary opinions and points of view. In 
this sense, the analysis made upon the hypotheses proposed at the beginning of this paper, 
which was firstly, that democratic political institutions create a democratic political culture; 
second, a democratic political culture creates democratic consolidation ocurrs, has showed a 
siginificant relationship between the three variables.  
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In relation to the political approaches, this paper could be classified in the middle ground 
between “institutionalists” and “weakly culturalists”, given to the fact that it demonstrates that 
both features have the same importance regarding democratic consolidation. In this sense, 
neither of them, be it democratic political institutions alone, or democratic political culture can 
contribute to democratic consolidation by themselves. Consequently, only when a democtratic 
political regime has been established, and its institutions are already solid and stable, citizens’ 
attitudes and believes would be shaped into a democratic political culture. Consolidation, then, 
can only come when a democratic political regime relies upon these two pillars, and citizens 
come to the belief, that there is no other option, that could bring a greater benefit to the 
political and social contexts of their country, than a democratic regime; in other words, 
democracy becomes consolidated, when strong democratic institutions, influence peoples 
preferences and they come to the believe that democracy is the only game in town.     
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